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Samenvatting
Banken spelen een cruciale rol in de financiering van het midden- en
kleinbedrijf (MKB). Het MKB representeert een grote fractie van alle bedrijven in
veel economieën en levert aanzienlijk bij aan werkgelegenheid en groei. Echter,
het MKB is minder transparant met betrekking tot informatievoorziening, meer
risicovol, meer financieel beperkt en meer afhankelijk van banken dan grote
bedrijven, wat leidt tot serieuze uitdagingen in de financiering van het MKB. In
deze oratie focus ik op de middelen die zijn ontwikkeld met betrekking tot
kredietverschaffing om om te gaan met belangrijke uitdagingen in de finan -
ciering van het MKB. Ik presenteer bewijs uit twee recente empirische studies.
De eerste conclusie is dat het aangaan van kredietrelaties werkt. Door gebruik te
maken van een meta-analyse tussen landen laten we zien dat kredietnemers
over het algemeen voordeel ondervinden van een kredietrelatie. Het MKB
ontvangt meer krediet en / of lagere rentes via kredietrelaties. Bovendien bieden
kredietrelaties grotere voordelen als de concurrentie tussen banken hoger is. De
tweede conclusie is dat handelskrediet slechts beperkte mogelijkheden biedt
om bankkrediet te vervangen, wanneer het laatst genoemde onderworpen is
aan een schok. Europese midden- en kleinbedrijven hebben een schok aan het
bankkrediet tot op zekere hoogte kunnen opvangen met handelskrediet. Substi -
tutie tussen deze twee vormen van krediet is echter moeilijker geworden
gedurende de financiële crisis en was slechts mogelijk voor een beperkt aantal
bedrijven: die met een betere kredietwaardigheid en een gemiddelde financiële
beperking. Kortom, het begrijpen van de middelen tot kredietverschaffing, zoals
kredietrelaties en handelskrediet, is essentieel voor kredietverstrekkers, krediet -
nemers en beleidsmakers om het functioneren van MKB financiering te
waarborgen. 
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Abstract
Banks play a crucial role for the financing of small and medium-sized enter -
prises (SMEs). SMEs represent a large fraction of all firms in many economies and
contribute significantly to employment and growth. But, SMEs are more infor -
mationally opaque, more risky, more financially constrained, and more bank-
dependent than large firms, which creates serious challenges in SME finance. In
this inaugural address, I focus on lending technologies to cope with key challen -
ges in SME finance. I present evidence from two recent empirical studies. The
first conclusion is that relationship lending works. Applying meta-analysis in a
cross-country context, we show that, on average, borrowers benefit from
relation ship lending. SMEs obtain more credit and / or lower loan rates under rela -
tionship lending. Furthermore, bank competition makes benefits for borrowers
more likely. The second conclusion is that trade credit has limited scope to replace
bank debt when the latter is subject to a shock. SMEs in Europe have countered a
shock to their bank debt to some extent with trade credit. However, substitution
has become increasingly difficult during the financial crisis and was only possible
for a subset of firms: the ones with better credit quality and intermediate
financial constraints. Overall, a comprehensive under standing of lending techno -
logies such as relationship lending and trade credit is critical for lenders,
borrowers, and policymakers to ensure the proper functio ning of SME finance.
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1. Introduction
Dear Rector Magnificus and Dean,
Distinguished colleagues and guests,
Dear friends and family,
In this inaugural address, I reflect on the role of banks in SME finance. From
an academic perspective there are at least two objective reasons why this topic
is interesting. First, SMEs are highly relevant for economic activity. Second, SME
finance faces serious challenges because these firms have special characte -
ristics.
In addition, there are some subjective reasons why I decided to talk about
this topic. I have substantial personal experience with SMEs since my father has
had his own small business for 25 years. Moreover, before starting my academic
career, I was a banker at a local savings bank that focused on SME lending. At that
time, I developed a profound interest in bank lending, credit markets, and credit
risk, and this interest has grown over time.
Today I am accepting the Chair of Banking and Finance, which is endowed by
Erasmus Trust Fund. I am happy and proud that I can continue to contribute to
academic research and teaching, and can have an impact on society in this
position.
I will start my talk with a motivation that leads to the key questions I am
raising today: Do lending technologies work? Who benefits? Are there diffe -
rences across countries? What do SMEs do when banks cut lending? I summarize
two recent empirical studies that provide evidence on these questions and draw
two main conclusions. Then, I briefly outline the activities of the Chair of
Banking and Finance. I end with words of thanks and would like to invite you to
a reception afterwards.
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2. Banks, SMEs, and Lending Technologies
Banks exist because capital markets are not perfect. The theory of financial
intermediation has shown that frictions in capital markets, especially asym -
metric information and transaction costs, are the raison d’être for financial
intermediaries (Boot, 2000). Banks help alleviate the costs arising from these
frictions. A bank’s core activities are deposit taking and lending. Banking
research has shown that banks provide liquidity and intertemporal insurance;
they act as information producers and delegated monitors, relationship lenders,
and as a bridge between optimists and pessimists in the economy (Diamond
and Dybvig, 1983; Diamond, 1984; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Coval and Thakor,
2005). Banks transform the risk of financial contracts, the maturity, and the lot
size. For example, think of demand deposits, which can be withdrawn at any
time, that are transformed into investment loans for companies. Demand
deposits are usually small, short-term, and safe, while investment loans are
usually large, long-term, and risky. Furthermore, banks are essential for mone -
tary transmission from the central bank and they operate a large part of the cash
and non-cash payment system in the economy. Banks have added many more
activities, and they have become increasingly interconnected, complex, and
therefore systemically important.
SMEs are of key importance for the economy in many countries. SMEs are
bakers, butchers, electricians, and many other professions. According to the
definition of the European Commission (2006), SMEs are firms with fewer than
250 employees, with turnover of less than 50 million euro, and total assets less
than 43 million euro. SMEs represent 98% of all firms, and contribute 67% to
total employment and 56% to total gross value added in the European Union.
Last year there were approximately 21 million SMEs in EU. In the Netherlands, for
example, 99% of all firms are SMEs, and a recent report states (MKB in Beeld,
2014): “Het midden en kleinbedrijf (MKB) is de motor van de Nederlandse
economie.” The same holds for many other countries.
SME finance is challenging because these firms are more informationally
opaque, more risky, more financially constrained, and more bank-dependent
than large firms. They cannot access capital markets or issue stocks or bonds.
They largely depend on bank loans and trade credit to raise external finance. On
average, the default risk of SMEs is as high as that of non-investment grade rated
firms with credit ratings in the range from BB to B (e.g., Dietsch and Petey, 2004).
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Berger and Udell (2006) have proposed a framework to describe and analyze
modes of SME finance, focusing on the concept of lending technologies and
various country-specific overall environments. They define a lending technology
as “a unique combination of primary information source, screening and under -
writing policies / procedures, loan contract structure, and monitoring strategies /
mechanisms.” 
The following major lending technologies are used in practice: (i) financial
statement lending, (ii) small business scoring, (iii) asset-based lending, (iv)
factoring, (v) fixed-asset lending, (vi) leasing, (vii) relationship lending, and (viii)
trade credit. The first six lending technologies can be classified as transactional
lending, relying on hard information about the financial conditions of the
borrower and / or on collateral. While relationship lending is based on private
and soft information, trade credit cannot be easily classified, sharing features of
relationship and transactional lending. Berger and Udell (2006) argue that the
lending technology, together with the financial institution structure (large vs.
small, foreign vs. domestic, state-owned vs. privately-owned, competition) and
the lending infrastructure (information, legal, judicial, bankruptcy, social, tax,
and regulatory environments), influence the credit availability and lending
terms for small businesses in a country.
P
R
O
F
. 
D
R
. 
L
A
R
S
 N
O
R
D
E
N
T
H
E
 R
O
L
E
 O
F
 B
A
N
K
S
 I
N
 S
M
E
 F
IN
A
N
C
E
12
B&T15037 van norden oratie binnen
3. Benefits of Relationship Lending1
3.1 Motivation
Relationship lending has a bright side and a dark side (e.g., Boot, 2000).
Strong bank-borrower relationships help reduce asymmetric information
between lenders and borrowers, the bright side. But, at the same time, these
relationships can create hold-up problems whereby the lender captures the
borrower to extract rents, the dark side. Hence, the overall effect of strong bank
relationships is a trade-off in costs and benefits between lenders and borrowers
through interactions across time, space, and financial products. The empirical
evidence on the effects of relationship lending is mixed because of substantial
differences in data sources, measurement approaches, dimensions of relation -
ships, and research methods. In particular, research has neither documented nor
systematically analyzed cross-country differences in relationship lending yet. It
is not clear what underlying country-level factors drive the differences in
relation ship benefits across economies, and in what way these factors affect the
outcomes of relationship lending. In this paper, we conduct the first meta-
analysis on the benefits of relationship lending to quantify the heterogeneity in
the results, and provide country-level explanations for differences in relation -
ship lending outcomes.
Early research on financial intermediation examined the role of banks in
information production (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan
and Thakor, 1984; Boyd and Prescott, 1986). Further theoretical work created the
foundations for a more focused examination of bank monitoring (e.g., Sharpe,
1990; Diamond, 1991; Rajan, 1992; Boot and Thakor, 2000; Hauswald and Marquez,
2006). Empirical studies on relationship lending have produced evidence that
focuses primarily on the benefits of a banking relationship (e.g., Petersen and
Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Berlin and Mester, 1999). However, there is no
clear consensus on whether, and under which conditions, relationship lending is
beneficial for the borrower, the bank, or both. 
Relationship lending is one of the most important lending technologies (e.g.,
Berger and Udell, 2002; Berger et al., 2005; Bharath et al., 2011) and for many
private firms, especially SMEs, it is the key source of external financing (e.g.,
Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2005; De la
Torre, Martinez Peria, and Schmukler, 2010; Berger and Black, 2011; Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt, Martinez Peria, 2011). Close bank-borrower relationships might
create benefits for both sides if the inefficiencies stemming from informational
1 This chapter is based on Kysucky, V., Norden, L., 2014. The Benefits of Relationship Lending in a
Cross-Country Context: A Meta-Analysis. Management Science, forth coming.
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problems are reduced. Hence, the effects of a strong bank-firm relationship are
not necessarily a zero-sum game. On the one hand, banks can better assess the
risk of default for existing borrowers, while the latter might benefit from
improved credit availability and more favorable borrowing terms over time. On
the other hand, banks might follow an intertemporal pricing strategy by
offering attractive lending terms at the beginning of a relationship to win over a
customer but then raising the loan rates and fees for subsequent business. Since
the bank observes proprietary information about the borrower, and the
borrower cannot transfer this private information to another lender, the bank
acquires an informational monopoly over the borrower. In particular, a close
bank-borrower relationship might create a lock-in effect (hold up, ex-post
monopoly power) if the borrower does not have sufficient alternative banking
relationships (e.g., Degryse and Ongena, 2005), or if the borrower faces high
switching costs (e.g., Ioannidou and Ongena, 2010; von Thadden, 2004; Kim,
Kliger, and Vale, 2003; Rajan, 1992; Sharpe, 1990; Greenbaum, Kanatas, and
Venezia, 1989). 
However, borrowers might have incentives for moral hazard in both strong
and weak bank relationships. If an important borrower is in financial distress
and the relationship with the bank is relatively strong, the borrower has an
incentive to rely on a “too-big-to-fail” effect. Instead of making an effort to
improve its financial conditions, the borrower might simply gamble on getting
more funds from the bank. Or, a relatively risky borrower has an incentive to hide
private knowledge about the risk of default in a weak bank relationship, as long
as there is a possibility to benefit from lending terms that are more favorable
compared to the true default risk. 
In this study we examine whether the bright side or the dark side of
relationship lending dominates and which factors drive the effects in a cross-
country context. We carry out a meta-analysis to summarize and explain the
heterogeneity of results in the literature and identify the factors that influence
the likelihood of borrower benefits. Meta-analysis has several advantages over
field evidence-based empirical research or qualitative surveys. It provides a set
of formal quantitative tools to summarize the results on a common topic and
explains differences in study-to-study variation in outcomes. Moreover, it offers
objective perspective and avoids potential biases of individual judgment.
Combining outcomes from different studies provides greater explanatory
power. Meta-analysis has been used in medical sciences and has found
increasing application in social sciences (e.g., Hedges and Olkin, 1985; Hunter
and Schmidt, 1990; Stanley, 2001; Lipsey and Wilson, 2001; Doucouliagos and
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Ulubasoglu, 2008; Borenstein et al., 2009; examples of applications in finance:
Capon, Farley, and Hoenig, 1990; Coggin, Fabozzi, and Rahman, 1993; van Ewijk, de
Groot, and Santing, 2012). 
Meta-analysis is especially useful in our setting. The data used in empirical
studies on relationship lending range from country-specific firm surveys or
samples to proprietary credit file data from individual banks. Moreover, there
are substantial differences in measurement approaches, focus on relationship
dimensions, and empirical methods. Such heterogeneity in research makes it
challenging to compare and generalize the findings in a qualitative literature
review. By combining evidence from a large number of different studies, meta-
analysis allows us to quantify the overall effect of relationship lending, increase
the number of observations from different sources and time periods, reduce the
impact of sampling errors within individual studies, and control for the
unobserved between-study heterogeneity. Importantly, we identify the sources
of disagreement among the studies and introduce new country-level data to
test the hypotheses on economic drivers that account for the differences in
relationship lending outcomes among the economies.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
We develop a multi-dimensional conceptual framework that links the
strength of lending relationships with lending outcomes. Key dimensions of the
strength of the lending relationships are: time, distance, exclusivity, and cross-
product synergies (Norden, 2009). The lending outcomes in our framework are:
loan rates, credit volume, collateral, and maturity. These dimensions are
microeconomic in nature because they depend on the borrower, the bank, and
bank-borrower relationship characteristics. Figure 1 presents the framework.
Time represents a relationship dimension that is characterized by repeated
interactions between contracting parties, validation of the interactions,
potential learning, and collection of public and private information (e.g., Boot,
2000). The age of the borrower is considered as a proxy for public information
about a firm. Older firms are more likely to pay lower interest rates (Petersen and
Rajan, 1994; Harhoff and Körting, 1998; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000) and
obtain more credit (Cole, 1998). However, other studies fail to find a significant
effect on borrowing costs (Angelini, Di Salvo, and Ferri, 1998; Lehmann and
Neuberger, 2001). Duration of the relationship is the proxy for production of
private information. Lenders obtain more private information about the
borrower the longer the relationship. Empirical evidence does not provide a
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clear answer whether longer relationships are beneficial for borrowers. Berger
and Udell (1995) find that borrowers in longer relationships pay lower loan
spreads, whereas Angelini, Di Salvo, and Ferri (1998) report the opposite effect,
implying the hold-up problem by the bank. A number of studies do not find a
clear outcome in either direction (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Blackwell and
Winters, 1997; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Harhoff and Körting, 1998; Machauer and
Weber, 1998; Lehmann and Neuberger, 2001). In addition, continuous and long-
term interaction between a loan officer and a borrower allows a bank to produce
more private information over time (Scott, 2004; Uchida, Udell, and Yamori, 2012;
Howorth and Moro, 2012). But, the scope and usage of the information is affected
by loan officers’ incentives and the internal organization of the lending process
(Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravasini, 2010).
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework for the strength of bank relationships
Distance is a relationship dimension that has important implications for the
type and usage of information produced by banks. We consider physical,
organizational, and personal distance. A further category could be cultural
distance (Giannetti and Yafeh, 2012). However, given that the vast majority of
studies on relationship lending are based on single-country data, we cannot
consider this aspect. In general, earlier studies find a negative correlation
between loan rates and physical distance, but the overall outcome depends on
the proximity of competing banks (Degryse and Ongena, 2005) and the avail -
ability of soft and hard information (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010). Further -
more, studies show that technological change has increasingly facilitated
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lending at distance (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 2002; DeYoung, Glennon, and
Nigro, 2008). Banks’ organizational structure and the separation from decision-
making also influence the strength of relationships (e.g., Stein, 2002). Closer
organizational distance increases credit availability (Alessandrini, Presbitero,
and Zazzaro, 2009), but the effect is ambivalent for collateral requirements.
Whereas Cowling (1999) finds a positive relation between organizational
distance and collateral, Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina (2009) report a negative
relation. Organizational distance and the use of information vary with  firm and
bank size. Personal interaction and soft information production are relatively
more important for small banks (Cole, Goldberg, and White, 2004; Berger et al.,
2005; Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe, 2008; Uchida, Udell, and Yamori, 2012), but
the comparative advantages between small and large banks vary across lending
technologies and firm sizes (Berger and Black, 2011).
Exclusivitydenotes the extent to which a firm concentrates its borrowings on
a single lender. Information might be more complete, more accurate, and easier
to interpret the more exclusive a bank relationship is. Firms with a relatively
large number of lending relationships tend to be riskier in the sense that
leverage and the share of unsecured bank debt are higher (e.g., Jiménez and
Saurina, 2004). Empirical studies show that more exclusive relationships are
associated with beneficial credit terms for borrowers (e.g., Petersen and Rajan,
1994; Machauer and Weber, 1998; Harhoff and Körting, 1998; Degryse and Van
Cayseele, 2000; Lehmann and Neuberger, 2001; Degryse and Ongena, 2005),
although exclusive banks might be prone to take advantage of their monopoly
position (e.g., Machauer and Weber, 1998). More generally, the bargaining power
of banks and borrowers affect how benefits from close bank relationships are
distributed between both sides (Grunert and Norden, 2012).
Cross-product synergies represent the scope of the financial services
provided by the bank. Lenders and / or borrowers may benefit from increased
information production and shared costs of multiple services (e.g., Calomiris
and Pornrojnangkool, 2009). A key source of informational synergies for
commercial banks might be the simultaneous provision of lending, payment
services, and deposit taking (e.g., Nakamura, 1993; Mester, Nakamura, and
Renault, 2007; Norden and Weber, 2010; and Kano et al., 2011). Concurrent use of
information about credit line usage and checking account activity is related to
improved default predictions (Norden and Weber, 2010) and longer maturities
(Kirschenmann and Norden, 2012). Chakraborty and Hu (2006) find that
collateral requirements decrease as the number of financial services provided by
the lender increases.
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3.3 Data
We identify the original studies that we use as input for the meta-analysis in
two ways. First, we look for the terms “relationship lending” and “relationship
banking” in the following six databases: ISI Web of Knowledge, Scopus,
ScienceDirect, JSTOR, ABI / Inform, and SSRN. Specifically, we search in the fields
“title”, “abstract”, “keywords”, or their equivalents. This strategy results in a total
of 850 matches as of May 2012. Second, as common in meta-analyses, we perform
a reverse lookup of references in the literature survey articles on relationship
lending by Boot (2000), Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004), and Degryse and Ongena
(2008). From the reverse lookup, we obtain additional 438 matches. After
eliminating missing records, both strategies yield a raw sample of 1,258 studies.
We search the above databases for more recent or published versions of all
unpublished papers and make replacements wherever appropriate. 
We then apply several filter rules to arrive at the final sample. We exclude
papers with no empirical results and those with no information on relationship
lending and lending outcomes. Next, we eliminate studies that are written in a
language other than English, and historical studies with data prior to 1970. Since
we focus on corporate borrowers, we also remove studies that deal with consu -
mer lending. In the next step, we analyze the empirical strategy of all remaining
papers and keep those that meet criteria for consistent meta-analysis:
(i) empirical results contain at least one multivariate regression model with one
of the lending terms as the dependent variable and a proxy for the lending
relationship’s strength as the explanatory variable, (ii) the relationship strength
proxies and lending outcomes fall into one of the above categories, and (iii)
information about the effect size (i.e., the regression coefficient that indicates
the relation between the dependent and independent variable) and its statis -
tical significance are available, complete, and comparable within each category.
Applying these filters yields a final sample of 101 studies, consisting of 75
published and 26 unpublished papers. 
We ensure that our selection criteria do not create a systematic bias by
checking three potential sources of biases: language selection, time period, and
inclusion of published / unpublished studies. We find that studies conducted in
languages other than English do not influence our analysis because their
number is very low. Before applying content-related filters, there are only three
non-English studies in our raw sample of 1,258 studies. There are two studies
from the period prior to 1970, both from the industrialization era. We do not
consider these two banking history studies because the socio-economic, legal,
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and regulatory environment has significantly changed since then. In addition,
consistent with the current practice in meta-analysis, we include unpublished
studies in our meta-database and in empirical tests we control for observed
publication-level variables that might create a systematic bias.
For each study, we manually collect information on the link between
relationship lending and loan terms from all of the tables in a study, including
the appendices. This data collection leads to a sample of 2,979 estimation results
(hereafter “effects”). The basis of the selected studies is 4.1 million firm-period
observations. We collect key characteristics of the selected studies and
corresponding country-level variables from publication sources (e.g., ISI Journal
Citations Reports, Web of Science, The World Bank Country Indicators, etc.). The
studies in our sample are based on data from Europe (43 studies), the US (35),
Asia (18), and Latin America (5), and span the period from 1970 to 2008. Published
papers come mainly from journals on banking, finance, economics, and
business. The total number of unique firms in the original papers is around
60,000 from the US and 161,000 from other regions.
We obtain country-specific variables from external sources, primarily the
World Bank database. For each sample period of the original study, we calculate
the average indicator of country-level variables in overlapping periods where
country-level data is available. Across all country-level variables, on average 11%
of observations fall into time periods in which country-level series are available,
but no time overlap exists between the original sample period and the available
country indicator. In these cases, we use the closest available country-year
observation, the majority of which is within two years of the original sample
availability. We note that these indicators are persistent and do not have effect
on our analysis when we estimate the empirical models without the filled data.
3.4 Results
We differentiate the effects by lending relationship proxies and lending
outcome proxies. Table 1 shows the frequency distribution of the discrete effects.
Positive sign (+) denotes positive and significant effects, (-) denotes negative and
significant effects, and (ns) denotes not significant effects.
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Table 1: Distribution of discrete effects
Relationship lending outcomes
Strength of Coeff
relationship lending sign RATE VOL COLL MAT
TDUR + 67 74 17 2
- 102 *** 27 *** 33 ** 11 ---
ns 114 56 58 10
TAGE + 17 70 17
- 48 *** 20 *** 21 ---
ns 135 93 37 13
TOTIME + 7 31 7
- 14 20 6 ---
ns 39 36 3 1
EXCL + 137 132 46
- 225 *** 99 ** 22 *** 2 ---
ns 188 177 49 9
CROSSPROD + 4 72 9 4
- 114 *** 15 *** 12 ---
ns 86 59 17 11
DISTPHYS + 5 29
- 31 *** 23 --- ---
ns 31 44 5
DISTORG + 1 31 2
- 1 --- 14 ** 9 ---
ns 4 22 1
DISTPERS + 7
- 4 --- --- ---
ns 1 2
We find that longer, exclusive, and synergy-creating bank relationships are
likely to result in higher credit volumes and lower loan rates. Moreover, firms
pledge less collateral the longer they maintain the relationship. These findings
indicate that the benefits of relationship lending are of a more general nature
since they exist for multiple combinations of lending outcomes and relationship
strength proxies. For comparison, the empirical study of Petersen and Rajan
(1994) suggests that strong bank relationships primarily help increase the
availability of financing to firms, but have little impact on the financing costs.
The table shows a potential hold-up problem whereby higher exclusivity is
related to more collateral. This problem means that borrowers are either willing
to pledge more collateral to an exclusive lender as a signaling device, or lenders
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accumulate collateral to capture their clients. Close distance is typically
associated with more soft information production, which enables lenders to
more accurately assess the borrowers as well as the collateral. The effects on
distance, however, are mixed and based on a relatively small number of studies,
which does not allow us to identify a systematic pattern.
We now investigate which country characteristics affect the likelihood of
beneficial effects for the borrower. Countries and regions exhibit substantial
variation in the lending environment. Financial systems in continental Europe
and Japan are bank-based and concentrated. In the US, capital markets
dominate and the banking system is more fragmented, which is reflected by a
large number of small banks that provide relationship lending to small
businesses (Allen and Gale, 2000). We argue that the differences in relationship
lending benefits for borrowers across countries can be partially explained by
differences in the structural economic variables. In unreported bivariate
analyses, we find that the borrower benefits are 33% more likely in countries
with competitive banking markets. Specifically, when competition is high, 76%
of all effects are beneficial for the borrower. However, when competition is low,
only 43% of effects are beneficial. This finding is consistent across all relationship
dimensions. Figure 2 displays the average link between the borrower benefits
from relationship lending and bank competition by country. 
Figure 2: Borrower benefits and bank competition
P
R
O
F
. D
R
. L
A
R
S
 N
O
R
D
E
N
T
H
E
 R
O
L
E
 O
F
 B
A
N
K
S
 IN
 S
M
E
 F
IN
A
N
C
E
21
B&T15037 van norden oratie binnen
We find a significantly positive and robust linear relationship between
borrower benefits and bank competition. A simple bivariate cross-sectional OLS
regression has a slope coefficient of 0.59 (p-value<0.01 based on robust standard
errors) and an R2 of 41%. The largest benefits accrue to borrowers in the US,
Argentina, and Taiwan where bank competition is the highest. The smallest
borrower benefits are observed in Europe, especially in countries with low levels
of bank competition. 
We now continue with multivariate meta-regressions in Table 2. Model (1)
reports results with simple region effects. We find that the relationship lending
benefits for borrowers are stronger in the US compared to Europe, Asia, and Latin
America. The contrast is the largest in Japan. This result does not indicate that
relationship lending is less prevalent in these regions, but that the benefits for
borrowers are, ceteris paribus, lower in these regions.
Table 2: Meta-Regression
Method: Logit, pooled Logit, pooled Meta-regression, Robust
mixed effects meta-regression
Dep. Var: Discrete borrower Discrete borrower Continuous / Continuous /
benefits benefits Fisher’s z-score Fisher’s z-score
(1 = yes, 0 = no) (1 = yes, 0 = no)
Coeff. sig. Coeff. sig. Coeff. sig. Coeff. sig.
Lending environment
Bank competition 3.12 *** 0.07 *** 0.06 **
Bank deposits / GDP -1.62 *** -0.03 ** -0.03 **
Pct SME employment 0.00 0.00 0.00
Developed status 0.19 0.03 0.02
Legal system andproperty
rights 0.03 0.00 -0.01
Corruption index 0.10 -0.01 0.001
Inflation -0.10 0.00 0.00
Bank cost-income ratio -0.95 -0.03 -0.02
Regions
Region = Europe -1.97 ***
Region = Asia ex Japan -1.31 ***
Region = Japan -2.40 ***
Region = Latin America -1.54 **
Publication controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rel. lending outcomes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rel. lending dimensions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of studies 94 92 93 93
Number of observations 1,599 1,582 2,821 2,821
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.19
Tau2 0.009
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In Models (2) – (4) we explain the results of the studies with country-level
variables. The meta-regressions confirm the strong positive relation between
bank competition and benefits. The coefficient is strongest both in magnitude
and significance across all specifications. This finding is in line with the
argument that banks use relationships to retain customers in the face of
competition from other banks (e.g., Boot and Thakor, 2000, Degryse and Ongena,
2005). Banks exert effort in borrower-specific and / or industry-specific infor -
mation production and reward their relationship borrowers with more credit
and / or better lending terms to prevent them from switching to competitors.
Our result is also consistent with evidence provided by Black and Strahan (2002)
who document the impact of policy changes fostering competition in the US
banking sector on new incorporations and entrepreneurial activity.
We also find that borrowers in bank-based economies are less likely to obtain
relationship benefits. The magnitude of the effect is approximately half the size
of the bank competition. This suggests that banks’ advantages from deposit
funding liquidity do not necessarily translate into borrower benefits as
hypothesized. This finding hints at the possibility that larger capital markets
(lower bank orientation) exert competitive pressure on  banks to maintain
relatively larger borrower benefits. Moreover, we examine whether the
importance of SMEs in the economy, considered as lower bound proxy for the
prevalence of relationship lending in the country, matters. We find that the
prevalence of relationship lending does not automatically come along with
relationship lending benefits for borrowers. 
The rest of the lending environment characteristics are not significantly
related to relationship benefits. Specifically, we find no evidence that relation -
ship benefits for borrowers consistently differ in developing countries, in
countries with more developed legal systems, higher levels of corruption, or in
inflationary environments. Furthermore, we do not find that a higher level of
aggregate bank cost-efficiency is related to relationship lending benefits for
borrowers. 
While Models (1) and (2) of Table 2 are based on Logit analysis that considers
only the significant (discrete) effects, we include both significant and insigni -
ficant (continuous) effects in Models (3) and (4). The results remain robust when
we repeat the analysis using a mixed-effects meta-regression (Model 3) and a
robust variance meta-regression (Model 4). 
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3.5 Summary
The meta-analysis summarizes and explains the heterogeneity of the results
in the literature on relationship lending in a cross-country context. First, we find
that strong relationships are generally beneficial for borrowers, but that lending
outcomes differ across the relationship dimensions. The dimensions time, exclu -
sivity, and cross-product synergies are associated with lower loan rates and
higher credit volume. The results indicate that the beneficial effects of relation -
ship lending go beyond an improvement in credit availability to firms as
suggested by Petersen and Rajan (1994), and that banks trade off the costs and
benefits across different relationship dimensions and lending terms. 
Second, the meta-regressions show that the likelihood of borrower benefits
has a significant relation to the structure of banking markets. The benefits of
relationship lending for borrowers are more likely when bank competition is
high. We document a strong and positive monotonic link between bank compe -
tition and relationship lending benefits for borrowers. We further find that the
benefits for the borrowers are more likely in the US compared to the other
regions. Interestingly, the prevalence of relationship lending, as found in the
bank-based financial systems in Europe and Japan with a large fraction of
SME borrowers, does not automatically come along with benefits for these
borrowers.
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4. The Interplay of Bank Debt and Trade Credit2
4.1 Motivation
SMEs cannot raise external finance in capital markets. In other words, in
contrast to large firms, they cannot issue stocks or corporate bonds. Instead, they
have to rely on private debt: loans from banks or trade credit from suppliers.
Unfortunately, little is known about the interplay of bank debt and trade credit
at the firm level. This is surprising since trade credit represents the second
largest source of credit for SMEs after bank debt (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994;
Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Mian and Smith, 1994). Furthermore, trade credit
varies significantly across countries and over time. For instance, the median of
the ratio of accounts payables to total assets of SMEs between 2005 and 2011 is
26% in Italy, 19% in Spain, 18% in France, 13% in the UK, and 9% in Germany.
Research has only recently started to examine the importance of trade credit for
corporate finance in different contexts, such as effects of the financial crisis,
liquidity chains, and cost of capital (e.g., Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-
Garriga, 2013; Boissay and Gropp, 2013; Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen, 2011). 
In this study, we investigate whether SMEs increase trade credit after they
have experienced a shock to their bank debt. Stated differently, we study
whether there is a substitution relationship between firms’ use of bank debt
and trade credit and how this relationship can be explained over time and across
countries. This question is relevant because a high or low availability of debt
finance can amplify or weaken the business cycle, as documented in the finance-
growth and finance-development literature (e.g., King and Levine, 1993a; King
and Levine, 1993b; Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000; Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt,
2006). If firms counter a shock to their bank debt with trade credit, they stabilize
their access to credit through the cycle. However, if bank debt and trade credit
are complementary (i.e., they increase or decrease at the same time), then
booms and recessions are amplified, resulting in a higher volatility of economic
activity over time. Hence, gaining a better understanding of the interplay
between bank debt and trade credit over time and across countries has
important policy implications.
Some studies provide support for a substitution relationship between bank
debt and trade credit (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Biais and Gollier, 1997). This
is because trade credit represents external finance for firms that are unable to
attract sufficient bank debt because of severe financial constraints stemming
from informational asymmetries. Moreover, there is evidence that financially
2 This chapter is based on Illueca, M., Norden, L., van Kampen, S., 2014. Do SMEs counter a shock
to their bank debt with trade credit? Working Paper, December 2014. 
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unconstrained firms redistribute part of their bank debt to financially
constrained client firms by offering trade credit (Love, Preve, and Sarria-Allende,
2007; Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga, 2013). 
However, there is also evidence that bank debt and trade credit do not
exhibit a substitution relationship. First, the relationship between bank debt
and trade credit is time-varying. Bastos and Pindado (2013) and Kestens, Van
Cauwenberge, and Van der Bauwhede (2012) show that trade credit extension
has declined during the recent financial crisis due to the risk of credit contagion
in the supply chain. Firms become more constrained during recessions and
therefore we should see an increase in trade credit extension if the substitution
relationship holds in all states of economy. Second, there are also studies
showing that firms accumulate trade credit although they are unconstrained
and / or sufficiently liquid. Petersen and Rajan (1997) report a U-shaped relation -
ship between trade payables and profitability, but this relationship would be
monotonically decreasing under the substitution hypothesis. Similarly, Fisman
and Love (2003) show that firm age is positively related to trade credit, but
theoretically we would expect a negative relationship under the substitution
hypothesis.
Based on the evidence from the literature, it is not clear whether there is a
substitution or complementary relationship between trade credit and bank
debt and which factors drive the relationship between these two sources of
credit. The goal of this study is to provide comprehensive evidence on these
issues. We measure substitution effects with a novel Substitution Indicator that
allows us to identify a causal relationship. The analysis is based on an
international panel dataset on SMEs covering the period from 2006 to 2011.
4.2 Data
We collect firm data from the Orbis / Amadeus and SABI database from
Bureau van Dijk. It contains firm-year observations from the five largest
countries in the European Union (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the United
Kingdom). Data for Spain come from the SABI database, while data for the other
four countries are derived from Orbis / Amadeus. We restrict our analysis to
firms that are not publicly listed and that have total assets less than 43 million
euro in the last available year, following the definition of SMEs according to the
European Commission (European Commission, 2006). We exclude financial
firms, which is standard practice in empirical corporate finance research.
Moreover, in Orbis there are many data points that report values of zero,
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potentially having an ambiguous meaning; they can either mean zero,
“missing”, or “unknown”. To prevent this ambiguity in our dataset, we include
firms where the value of accounts payables, accounts receivables, and short-
term bank debt equals at least 1,000 euro in any of the years in our sample
period. 
Applying these selection criteria results in a balanced panel dataset with
yearly data from 2006 to 2011 (2006 to 2010 for Spain). It is crucial to have a
balanced panel for three reasons. First, we need to have firm-specific time series
data from the pre-crisis, the crisis period, and the post-crisis period to be able to
estimate the impact of the crisis on the substitution of trade credit. Second, the
substitution effect is captured by the yearly changes in short term bank debt
and trade credit, which requires time series data without gaps for both
variables. Third, an unbalanced sample would make the interpretation of the
results difficult. In Orbis, the number of firms included in the database differs for
each country, which results in certain countries being heavily over-represented
or under-represented in the dataset. Therefore, we construct the dataset so that
each country is given a weight that is proportional to its average GDP over the
sample period. The final dataset comprises 1,186 firms from Germany (28%), 922
from France (22%), 920 from the UK (21%), 751 from Italy (17%), and 501 from Spain
(12%).
4.3 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy relies on three elements to identify a causal effect.
First, we consider SMEs that have demand for credit. We note that a comple -
mentary relationship could mean two things: either firms cannot substitute or
they do not want to substitute. It is therefore crucial to investigate the substi -
tution between different sources of credit for firms that have demand for
external finance (Becker and Ivashina, 2014). We follow Rajan and Zingales (1998)
by considering only firm-year observations where the value of a firm’s invest -
ments exceeds the value of its cash flows to ensure that the firm has demand for
external finance. Second, we examine what happens when these firms
experience a negative shock to their bank debt. Third, we focus on the years of
the recent financial crisis when banks were forced to contract their credit supply. 
We define our dependent variable – the Substitution Indicator – conditional
on the firm experiencing a negative shock to its bank debt in the previous year. It
has three possible outcomes: both bank debt and trade credit decreases
(complementary); bank debt decreases and trade credit increases, but it does not
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fully compensate for the decrease in bank debt (partial substitution); and bank
debt decreases and trade credit fully compensates for the decrease in bank debt
(perfect substitution).
The most important independent variable is credit quality of the firm,
measured by the Altman Z-score (Z) for private firms (Altman, 1968). The Altman
Z-Score is a widely used composite measure of credit quality (firm default risk)
and includes several factors that are related to credit quality such as liquidity,
retained earnings, profitability, leverage, sales, and size. 
Moreover, we consider SMEs’ financial constraints. Financial constraints tend
to be different from financial distress. They mainly arise because of a mismatch
between firms’ investments and funding, which could be due to growth
opportunities and / or high costs of external finance. We measure financial
constraints by the Kaplan-Zingales Index (KZ; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). In order
to measure a potential non-monotonic relationship between the Altman Z-Score
and the KZ-Index, we group the KZ-Index into quintiles. We further consider the
impact of the financial crisis with a set of dummy variables that indicate
different stages of the crisis. In continental Europe, the first (second) stage of the
crisis, D_Crisis1 (D_Crisis2), is a dummy equal to 1 in 2008 (2009) and 0 otherwise.
We mark 2009 as the second stage of the crisis because Lehman Brothers
collapsed in September 2008, which is considered as the start of a deep global
recession (Kahle and Stulz, 2013). In the UK, we mark 2007 (2008) as the first
(second) stage as the crisis started earlier in the UK because of its strong ties to
the US. The last stage is a dummy variable that equals to 1 (D_Aftermath) in 2010-
2011 (2009-2011 for the UK), which is the period directly after the crisis in which
the world economy experienced growth again. We also add several control
variables that could explain the substitution indicator. We consider firm size
(LnTA), measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, collateral (long-term
collateral is measured by fixed tangible assets (TangFA); short-term collateral by
inventories (Inv)), cash and cash equivalents divided over total assets (Cash), and
firm profitability measured by RoA. In all regressions, we control for industry and
country fixed effects. 
4.4 Results
Figure 3 displays the average outcomes of the Substitution Indicator across
countries over time. Category (-1) refers to firm-year observations in which bank
debt and trade credit decreased (negative complementary relationship).
Category (0) refers to firm-year observations in which bank debt decreased and
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trade credit partially increased (partial substitution). Category (1) refers to firm-
year observations in which bank debt decreased and trade credit increased at
least as much (perfect substitution).
Figure 3: Evolution of the average Substitution Indicator
We can see that the outcome (-1) significantly increased from approximately
40% in 2007 to approximately 70% in 2009. This finding shows that SMEs were
increasingly cut off from external finance as the financial crisis unfolded.
Furthermore, partial substitution (outcome (0)) increased from 2008 to 2010.
Finally, full substitution continued to decrease in 2008 and in 2009, and only
turned around in 2010.
We now investigate which factors influence whether and how SMEs counter
a shock to their bank debt with trade credit with a multinomial logit model. We
regress the Substitution Indicator on the Altman Z-Score, the dummy variables
for the different stages of the crisis, and the control variables. Table 3 reports the
odds ratios (instead of coefficients) as their magnitude can be more easily
interpreted.
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Table 3: Cross-country regression results for the probability of substitution
(1) (2)
Full Sample External finance-
dependent firms
Dep. Var: Partial Perfect Partial Perfect)
Z(t-1) 1.033 1.153 1.078 1.190
(0.258) (0.000) *** (0.019) *** (0.000) ***
D_Crisis1 0.711 0.763 0.674 0.738
(0.003) *** (0.002) *** (0.003) *** ().002) ***
D_Crisis2 0.540 0.392 0.516 0.363
(0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) ***
D_Aftermath 1.230 0.847 1.248 0.819
(0.030) ** (0.028) ** (0.045) ** (0.018) **
LnTA(t-1) 0.849 0.873 0.812 0.841
(0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) ***
Cash(t-1) 0.682 1.068 0.679 1.008
(0.210) (0.764) (0.275) (0.975)
Inv(t-1) 1.376 0.884 1.469 0.897
(0.063) * (0.383) (0.042) ** (0.477)
TangFA(t-1) 1.538 1.268 1.602 1.174
(0.003) *** (0.045) ** (0.003) *** (0.234)
RoA(t-1) 2.318 1.434 1.107 1.327
(0.073) * (0.315) (0.852) (0.515)
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.027 0.035
Firm-Years 8,831 7,049
Column (1) of Table 3 shows that the credit quality measure Z-Score has a
significantly positive effect on the probability of partial and perfect substitution
in the full sample. A one-percentage increase in the Altman Z-Score is associated
with a 15% increase in the probability of perfect substitution. This result implies
that substitution for high-risk firms is not as easy as suggested in the literature.
We further find that the probability of substitution dropped significantly
during the financial crisis and increased again after the crisis. The probability of
perfect and partial substitution is lower during the first stage of the crisis and
decreases even more during the second stage. After the crisis, the willingness of
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suppliers to provide trade credit to their customers increased again. The
probability of partial substitution is higher compared to the pre-crisis period.
The probability of perfect substitution also improved, but it is still lower than
before the crisis. 
The results become stronger if we only consider firms that have demand for
credit. In column (2), the relationship between the Z-Score and partial substi -
tution becomes significant, but stays smaller than the one for perfect substi -
tution. We thus conclude that – all else equal – the relationship between credit
quality and substitution is monotonic; the best credit quality firms perfectly
substitute, the intermediate firms partially substitute, and the worst credit
quality firms experience a decrease in bank debt and trade credit. We further
repeat the analysis for the crisis years only, with variables demeaned at the
country-level median, and with a modified substitution indicator that takes into
account the payback time for trade credit instead of its volume. We obtain
results that are similar to the reported ones in all three tests.
Finally, we examine the possibility that the effect of the Altman Z-Score on
the probability of substitution has a non-monotonic relationship with the level
of financial constraint. For this purpose, we interact the Z-Score with dummies
for the KZ-Index quintiles. The results are shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: Sensitivity of perfect substitution to firm credit quality by financial constraints
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The results indicate an inversely U-shaped relationship between the sensitivity
of the probability of substitution to the Z-Score and financial constraints. The
pattern is broadly consistent across the five countries. The evidence shows that
the credit quality matters most for firms with intermediate financial constraints.
Credit quality is less relevant for firms with low financial constraints because
they can attract external finance from other sources, or they can afford to
deleverage because of sufficient internal finance. Moreover, credit quality is also
less relevant for firms with high financial constraints because they tend to be
credit rationed anyway.
4.5 Summary
We investigate whether SMEs can counter a shock to their bank debt with
trade credit and which factors influence their response over time and across
countries. We focus on SMEs because they are credit-constrained and bank-
dependent. Our analysis is based on a firm-specific time-varying multinomial
measure, the Substitution Indicator, which we apply to data on SMEs from the
five largest countries in the European Union between 2006 and 2011.
We find that substitution and complementary relationships are almost
equally likely to occur in terms of firm-year observations. However, this
relationship varies substantially with firm characteristics and over time. The
probability of a negative complementary relationship doubled from 2006 to
2009. The main driver of the probability of substitution after a negative shock to
bank debt is the credit quality of the firm. Moreover, the probability of
substitution decreased after the crisis unfolded. Interestingly, the impact of
credit quality on the probability of substitution is non-monotonically related to
the level of financial constraints. Firm default risk is most crucial for firms with
intermediate financial constraints, while it is less important for the least and
most constrained firms. 
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5. Conclusions
In this inaugural address, I focus on the role of banks in SME finance. SMEs
are of key importance for the economy in many countries. They represent a large
fraction of all firms and contribute significantly to employment and economic
activity. However, financing SMEs creates serious challenges for lenders because
of the special characteristics of these firms. Lending technologies have evolved
to cope with these challenges in SME finance. Relationship lending and trade
credit are the most important ones in the context of SME finance. Based on the
evidence from two recent empirical studies, I would like to draw two main
conclusions.
The first conclusion is that relationship lending works. The first study shows
that, on average, borrowers benefit from relationship lending. Importantly, bank
competition makes the benefits for borrowers more likely: they obtain more
credit and / or lower loan rates. However, the prevalence of relationship lending,
as in Europe or Japan, does not automatically imply that borrower benefits are
high.
The second conclusion is that trade credit has limited scope to replace bank
debt. Trade credit is an alternative to bank debt, but little is known whether and
to what extent SMEs use trade credit to counter a shock to their bank debt. This
question is especially relevant in times of a systemic crisis when all banks cut
lending. The second study shows that there is substantial time and cross-
country variation in the interplay between bank debt and trade credit. SMEs
with a better credit quality are more likely to counter a shock to their bank debt
with trade credit. However, this substitution was less likely when it was most
needed, i.e., during the financial crisis.
Overall, a comprehensive understanding of lending technologies such as
relationship lending and trade credit is critical for lenders, borrowers and
policymakers to ensure the proper functioning of SME finance.  
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